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I. Introduction
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution confers
extraordinary protection upon the states: immunity from suit in federal court
without their consent.1 Although old, as constitutional doctrine goes,2 ascer-
taining to what extent the Eleventh Amendment incorporates the common-law
principle of sovereign immunity is the subject of a truly tortured line of
cases.4 Numerous academic commentators have addressed the question as
well.
5
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State"); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Eleventh Amend-
ment restricts right of private plaintiffs to sue unconsenting states in state court).
2. See JOHN V. ORTi, THE JUDICIAL PoWER OF THE UNITED STATES: TBE ELEVENH
AMENMENT IN AMEICAN HISTORY 6 (1987) (stating that ratification of Eleventh Amendment
occurred in 1795). A federal court first reported a decision construing the amendment in 1809.
See United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1236 (D. Penn. 1809) (No. 14,647) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment did not bar maritime or admiralty suits against state). The author of a
1987 book on the Eleventh Amendment described it then as still "one of the most obscure parts
of the Constitution." ORTH, supra, at vii.
3. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (1788) (declining jurisdiction
over tort suit on sovereign immunity gr6unds).
4. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct at 2246 (holding that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity in state courts pursuant to Article 1); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 47 (1996) (holding that states did not waive their sovereign immunity with ratification of
Commerce Clause); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-70 (1974) (deciding that Eleventh
Amendment bars damage awards that state treasury would pay); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
168 (1908) (allowing suit for injunctive relief against state officer to proceed notwithstanding
Eleventh Amendment); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890) (construing Eleventh
Amendment to bar suit against state by its own citizens); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419, 477 (1793) (deciding that Constitution did not recognize state sovereign immunity); see
also HowARD FNK & MARKV. TUSHNET, FEDERALJUISDICTION: POLICYAND PRACTICE 137
(1984) (describing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as "replete with historical anomalies,
internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions").
5. See, e.g., Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the
White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REv. 1, 6 (1967) (disputing that Eleventh Amend-
ment concerns judicial power at all); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign ImmunityDoctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 549 (1977) (describing state
sovereign immunity as common-law doctrine only); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpre-
tation oftheEleventhAmendment A Narrow Construction ofanAffirnative Grant ofJurisdic-
tion Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (1983)
(disputing historical accuracy of Supreme Court's view of Eleventh Amendment); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1893 (1983) (asserting that modem interpretation of Eleventh Amend-
ment differs from its drafters' original intent); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Cour4 the
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1988) (contending
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This Note asks whether a federal court has a jurisdictional obligation
to consider the Eleventh Amendment on its own motion even if a state defen-
dant does not invoke the privilege. This Note argues that the Eleventh
Amendment enjoys a textually-based constitutional status that, considered
with the policies behind sovereign immunity, requires courts to consider state
immunity just as courts consider subject matter jurisdiction: at all times and
sua sponte if they detect a potential bona fide Eleventh Amendment issue in
a pending case.6 In Part II, this Note surveys the Eleventh Amendment's
history and key jurisprudence.' Part ImI discusses the similarities between
state sovereign immunity and traditional jurisdictional doctrines! Part IV
examines the current disagreement among federal courts of appeals on the
issue of whether federal courts must raise the Eleventh Amendment on their
own motion.9 Part V presents two recent United States Supreme Court cases
concerning the law of state sovereign immunity and explains their significance
in determining whether states may waive their Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion by omission.'" Part VI discusses the ways in which both the Eleventh
Amendment and the traditional requirements of subject matter jurisdiction
promote federalism, and it argues that this similarity provides additional
support for their identical treatment in the federal courts." Finally, Part VII
of this Note summarizes the deficiencies of a court's decision that sua sponte
consideration of state sovereign immunity is merely permissive, and, with the
support of legal and prudential reasoning, Part VII promotes the adoption of
that sovereign immunity is remedy-oriented rather than jurisdiction-oriented); Lawrence C.
Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1345
(1989) (defending confinement of Eleventh Amendment's meaning to its text); Calvin R.
Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHL L. REV. 61, 67
(1989) (tying meaning of Eleventh Amendment to purpose of Tenth Amendment); John R.
Pagan, Eleventh AmendmentAnaysis, 39 ARK. L. Rav. 447,453-98 (1986) (proposing analyti-
cal framework for Eleventh Amendment issues).
6. See Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1427 (10th Cir. 1994) (declaring that
"Eleventh Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of Article Im
courts").
7. See infra Part H (surveying history of Eleventh Amendment and its key jurispru-
dence).
8. See infra Part III (discussing similarities between state sovereign immunity and
traditional jurisdictional doctrines).
9. See infra Part IV (discussing current circuit split on question of whether sua sponte
consideration of state sovereign immunity is mandatory).
10. See infra Part V (presenting two recent Supreme Court cases involving Eleventh
Amendment and explaining their significance for determining whether states may waive
sovereign immunity by omission).
11. See infra Part VI (comparing effects of Eleventh Amendment and subject matter
jurisdiction on promotion of federalism).
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a rule requiring mandatory sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
12
ff. The Love-Hate Relationship of the Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity
A. 'The Love
The most basic premises of Eleventh Amendment doctrine run along two
axes that demonstrate the origin of at least some ofthe puzzlement in this area
of the law." Study of the first axis reveals that courts have raised the Elev-
enth Amendment's bar to suits against states qua states beyond the protection
that the text itself gives.14 Read literally, the text ofthe Eleventh Amendment
precludes only suits against a state that citizens of another state or that citizens
of a foreign country bring in federal court." Because the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment effectively overruled the 1793 decision of the Supreme
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia6 - a diversity action in whichthe Court refused
to allow the state of Georgia to default on a private loan - the amendment's
narrow language is not surprising." The strict text of the Eleventh Amend-
12. See infra Part VII (summarizing jurisdictional status of Eleventh Amendment and
reasons that sua sponte consideration of it should be mandatory).
13. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480
(1987) (describing Eleventh Amendment case law as "incoherent"); Gibbons, supra note 5, at
1891 (describing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as "little more than a hodgepodge of
confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law"); Pagan, supra note 5, at 450-51
(noting "theoretical and historical illegitimacy" of Eleventh Amendment doctrine). Among
Professor Amar's illustrations of the Eleventh Amendment's "incoherence" is that the amend-
ment "is a subject matter bar that - unlike all others - may be waived (despite the fact that the
amendment nowhere suggests that 'consent' can cure a jurisdictional defect) and - unlike other
waivable bars (like personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process) - may be raised at any
time in the lawsuit" Amar, supra, at 1480 n.223.
14. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (extending protections of sovereign
immunity beyond language of Eleventh Amendment in order to avoid result "never imagined
or dreamed of').
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (precluding federal suits against states by citizens of other
states or by citizens of foreign countries).
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
17. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2251-52 (1999) (explaining that sole purpose
of Eleventh Amendment was to reverse Chisholm and thus "there was no reason to draft with
a broader brush"); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,426 (1793) (interpreting
Article IlI's suits against states provision to supersede preexisting state sovereign immunity).
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court decided whether a citizen of South Carolina could recover
money that the state of Georgia owed to him. Id. at 420. Alexander Chisholm was the executor
of the estate of a South Carolina citizen who supplied materials to Georgia during the Revolu-
tionary War. Id. at 421. The Georgia legislature appropriated the funds for this debt, but the
state executive refused to pay it. Id. at 422. At the date of the case, the Eleventh Amendment
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ment addresses the result in Chisholm point-by-point, just as the amendment's
proponents intended it to do.18 The Court eventually extended the amendment
further by holding in Hans v. Louisiana9 that permitting some federal court
suits against states to proceed on the simple basis of the plaintifffs citizenship
contravenes the most important policies behind the amendment.2" Today, the
Eleventh Amendment also bars federal suits against unconsenting states by
Indian tribes and foreign nations, as well as suits in admiralty, although the
text of the amendment itself confers none of these protections.21
B. The Hate
The second axis of Eleventh Amendment interpretation requires states to
defend some federal suits even when they do not consent to the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.' Over ninety years ago, in the seminal case of Ex parte
did not exist; accordingly, the Court determined that the language of Article Ill's suits against
states provision demonstrated a clear intent under the Constitution to permit suits against a state
by citizens of another state. Id. at 451-52. Thus, the Court awarded Chisholm a judgment that
the state treasury of Georgia paid. Id.
18. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.3, at 377 (2d ed. 1994)
(explaining that proponents of Eleventh Amendment intended it to overrule Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm); Cullison, supra note 5, at 12-14 (same). Professor Cullison described
the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment as "an attempt to wipe the slate clean - to dispel all
traces of Chisholm v. Georgia from the legal universe, and nothing more or less." Id. at 16.
19. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (attempting to prevent "anomalous"
consequences of strict adherence to text of Eleventh Amendment). In Hans, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit against the state of
Louisiana by one of its own citizens. Id. at 1. When Hans sought payment on bonds that the
state had issued, Louisiana refused. Id. at 2-3. Louisiana asserted that the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevented a private litigant from filing suit against a state in federal court. Id. at 9-11.
The Court agreed, emphasizing statements by Alexander Hamilton that state sovereign immu-
nity survived the enactment ofArticle I of the Constitution. Id. at 12-15. Moreover, the Court
acknowledged no evidence that state suability existed at common law. Id. at 16. Although the
text of the Eleventh Amendment addresses only suits brought against a state by citizens of
another state, or by citizens of a foreign country, the Court expressed incredulity at the notion
that the amendment intended to allow some federal court suits against states to proceed. Id. at
16-19. Thus, the Court extended the amendment's protection of states beyond the text and
found that the amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over Hans's suit. Id. at 21; see infra
Part Il (discussing main purposes of Eleventh Amendment in federal jurisdiction); infra Part
VI (discussing ways in which Eleventh Amendment promotes federalism).
21. See CHEMERINSY, supra note 18, § 7.4, at 383-85 (discussing Supreme Court's
extension of Eleventh Amendment bar to suits not mentioned in amendment's text); see also
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246 (interpreting Eleventh Amendment to prevent state court suits against
unconsenting states although amendment's text contemplates federal court suits only).
22. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, §§ 7.5-7.7 (describing methods by which courts
may ensure state compliance with federal law notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment).
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Young,' the Supreme Court first articulated its interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment that normally permits a suit for prospective relief against a state
officer. 4 However, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged that even this
idea constitutes a fiction under the law.' Nevertheless, the Exparte Young
action exemplifies the second axis of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by
demonstrating that, notwithstanding sovereign immunity principles, federal
courts sometimes can enforce federal law against recalcitrant states.26 The
theory behind the traditional Ex parte Young action insists that the injunctive
relief sought, usually an injunction against enforcement of a state law that a
plaintiff has challenged as violating the federal Constitution, will not actually
issue against the state qua stateY Instead, the injunction issues against the
relevant state office in the occupant's official capacity and remains valid as
against the office even if the occupant changes.' This notion is inherently
odd because the Ex parte Young plaintiff would not sue an individual state
officer in the first place but for the officer's official capacity and the officer's
official duties with respect to the challenged state law.29 However, the court
23. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
24. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (permitting federal jurisdiction over
suit against state officer for injunctive relief). In Exparte Young, the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit in federal court against a state
officer. Id. at 149. The plaintiffs in the case challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota
statute limiting railroad rates. Id. at 144. Rather than violate the statute and risk severe
penalties, the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the Attorney General of Minnesota, Edward
Young, to prevent him from beginning proceedings to enforce the challenged legislation. Id.
at 145-49. The district court issued the injunction, but Young reacted by filing a mandamus
action against the plaintiffs to compel their compliance with the law. Id. at 126. The district
court subsequently held Young in contempt, and Young petitioned the Supreme Court for
habeas corpus pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment Id. at 126-27. The Supreme Court
rejected his claim, holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not attach to an illegal act
by a state officer because the act loses its official character for constitutional purposes. Id. at
167. The Court relied on its traditional powers of equity to reach this result Id. at 162-63.
Thus, federal courts may issue injunctions against the performance of unconstitutional state acts
when the plaintiff names the state officer rather than the state itself as the defendant. Id. at 168.
25. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 280, 281 (1997) (referring to Ex
parte Young action as "fiction"); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105
(1984) (acknowledging that Exparte Young rests upon legal fiction).
26. See Young, 209 U.S. at 145-46 (enforcing supremacy of Fourteenth Amendment as
against Minnesota state law).
27. See id. at 159 (stating that officer loses immunity of sovereign when engaged in
unconstitutional act).
28. See id. at 168 (emphasizing that judgment in Exparte Young action runs against state
officer and not against state itself).
29. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an
Officer, 29 U. CM. L. REv. 435,435 (1962) (describing mechanics ofExparte Young action).
Professor Davis facetiously explained that
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issuing the injunction holds the state and not the individual state officer
responsible for carrying out the judgment."
Other decisions of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts over the last twenty-
five years further qualify the holding of Ex parte Young31 and in fact have
spawned a remarkable revival of the academic debate concerning the precise
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 2 However, a key dilemma in the prac-
tical administration of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity still exists:
Is the amendment an irreducible limitation on the federal judicial power?33 If
so, the Eleventh Amendment is like other constraints on the federal courts'
subject matter jurisdiction in that any party- or any court on its own motion-
may raise it at any time.34 If state sovereign immunity is not an irreducible
[w]hen you sue the government for an injunction or declaratoryjudgment, you must
falsely pretend (in the absence of special statute) that the suit is not against the
government but that it is against an officer. You may get relief against the sover-
eign if, but only if, you falsely pretend that you are not asking for relief against the
sovereign. The judges often will falsely pretend that they are not giving you relief
against the sovereign, even though you know and they know, and they know that
you know, that the relief is against the sovereign.
Id.
30. See CHEMvEUNSKY, supra note 18, § 7.5, at 392 (explaining that enjoining state
officers will prevent state conduct in violation of federal law).
31. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,287 (1997) (contending that some
state interests may render Exparte Young action unavailable); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Article I of Constitution is not waiver of states' sovereign
immunity); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29-30 (1991) (explaining differences between official
and individual capacities of state officers for purposes of Eleventh Amendment); Pennhurst
State Seh. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (preventing federal court from
issuing injunction against state for alleged violation of state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651,676-77 (1974) (explaining boundaries between prospective and retrospective relief).
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1034 (interpreting Eleventh Amendment not to
affect federal jurisdiction at all); Gibbons, supra note 5, at 1891-93 (criticizing three 1981
Supreme Court cases concerning Eleventh Amendment); Jackson, supra note 5, at 104-26
(advocating values for future Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence); Marshall, supra note 5, at
1371 (advocating adherence to text of Eleventh Amendment); Massey, supra note 5, at 147-50
(discussing implications of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning Eleventh Amendment);
James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1275 (1998) (purporting to offer new analysis of
history of Eleventh Amendment); Carlos Manuel V~zquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683,1691 (1997) (attempting to reconcile recent Eleventh Amend-
mentjurisprudence).
33. Cf 13 CHA E ALAN WRIGht T AL., FEDERALPRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 3524,
at 167 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that Supreme Court has not determined Eleventh Amendment's
precise jurisdictional status).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(hX3) (requiring courts to consider subject matter jurisdiction on
their own motions); see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) (dismissing case for want
of subject matter jurisdiction at Supreme Court level); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244
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limit on the federal judicial power, a more useful analogy is one to personal
jurisdiction so that a party permanently waives the immunity if the party fails
to raise it in an initial filing." This quagmire is the subject of a persistent
division in the United States Courts of Appeals and the focus of this Note.36
11. How Sovereign Immunity Looks Like Jurisdiction
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment have similar functions in limit-
ig the scope of matters before the federal courts. However, Article III is not
self-executing. 7 Consequently, the heads of federal court jurisdiction that
Article I describes merely provide Congress the authority to enact statutes
giving plaintiffs the right to file appropriately styled actions in federal court."
Contrast the self-executing Eleventh Amendment and the well-known uproar
in the wake of Chisholm.39 The popular reaction against the decision strongly
supports the notion of the Eleventh Amendment as "a jurisdictional trump
card" because Chisholm led to text that, by its own terms, bars an otherwise
(1934) (same); Mansfield, Cold &LakeMich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (same).
35. , See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (designating objections to personal jurisdiction waived
if not raised in parties' initial pleadings); New Jersey v. Chen (In re Chen), 227 B.R. 614, 622
(D.N.J. 1998) (finding sovereign immunity more like personal jurisdiction than like subject
matter jurisdiction so that state's appearance in federal litigation constituted consent to suit).
36. See Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448
(11 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (permitting but not requiring mandatory sua sponte consideration
of sovereign immunity); Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775, 777
n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1998)
(adopting mandatory sua sponte consideration of sovereign immunity), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct 69 (1999); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Suarez Corp. Indus. v.
McGraw, 125 F.3d 222,227 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust
v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked & Aban-
doned Vessel, Known As "The Sindia," 895 F.2d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Charley's
Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987)
(same); Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 702 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (same); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116,127 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
37. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (describing Congress's
control over federal jurisdiction).
38. See CHARIEs ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 27 (5th ed. 1994)
(stating that cases in federal court require both constitutional and statutory sources of subject
matter jurisdiction). Because no general federal question statute existed until 1875, until then
plaintiffs normally brought all such claims in state court. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 401
(discussing fora for federal question lawsuits before 1875); WRIGHT, supra, § 17, at 100-03
(describing origins of federal question statute); see also STEPHtEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 210 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that small number of individual federal statutes passed before
1875 included narrow grants of federal jurisdiction).
39. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of I-ighways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987)
(relating that "reaction to Chisholm was swift and hostile").
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proper federal suit from proceeding solely because of the identity of the
defendant.4" Implementing the amendment has never required any affirmative
legislation by the Congress.
In any event, the traditional requirements of subject matter jurisdiction
also dictate the conditions under which a party may properly maintain a
federal action.4 Over the entire course of a lawsuit, any party at anytime may
show that the court adjudicating the case lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter,42 or the court itself may so determine on its own motion.43 Upon such
a determination, the court dismisses the case because the Constitution renders
the court powerless to decide it.'"
A party entitled to sovereign immunity may waive immunity so that a suit
against it in federal court may proceed.45 This proposition presents the princi-
pal difficulty for a decision that sua sponte consideration of sovereign immu-
nity is mandatory.46 Waiver may be only for the case at bar,47 or waiver may
40. See Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd. v. Greenwood (In re Greenwood), Civ.A/
1:99-CV-088C, 1999 WL 605447, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 1999) (noting that "[i]n essence,
the Eleventh Amendment operates as a jurisdictional bar to suits filed in federal courts by
private individuals against an unconsenting state"); Massey, supra note 5, at 65 (describing
Eleventh Amendment's function as "jurisdictional trump card"); see also Alden v. Maine, 119
S. Ct. 2240, 2252 (1999) (asserting that "more natural inference" from circumstances under
which states ratified Eleventh Amendment "is that the Constitution was understood... to
preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits" and positing that amendment's
drafters merely intended it to "clarif~y] the only provisions of the Constitution that anyone had
suggested might support a contrary understanding"); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct 2219, 2223 (1999) (noting that "[t]hough its
precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one state by citizens of
another state or foreign state, we have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment...
repudiated the central premise of Chisholm").
41. See CH ERINSKY, supra note 18, § 5.1 (summarizing purposes of subject matterjuris-
diction requirement). Professor Chemerinsky's treatise notes that "parties cannot bring matters
to federal court where constitutional or statutory authority [for subject matter jurisdiction] is
lacking" and thatthis fact "helps to limitthe role ofthejudiciary in the federal system." Id. at249.
42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1364 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997) (establishing categories of
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts); CHeERINsKY, supra note 18, § 5.1 (explaining
that court's "subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any point and by either party").
43. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (discussing
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction raised on Court's own motion).
44. See id. at 154 (dismissing case for want of subject matter jurisdiction after Court
raised issue sua sponte).
45. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964) (allowing party to sue state
with state's consent despite Eleventh Amendment).
46. See Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 370-71 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (using availability of
waiver to explain that although sovereign immunity is not "wholly jurisdictional (such as
subject matter jurisdiction) ... [it is] sufficiently jurisdictional that it may be raised by the court
on its own motion").
47. See Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (noting state's
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occur when a statutory scheme permits all suits against the state that arise in
the course of a certain enterprise.48 One commentator reconciles this conflict
by contending that a state's consent to suit in federal court does not constitute
actual consent to the court's otherwise deficient subject matter jurisdiction,
"but rather [constitutes] the privilege of enforcing a limitation on the exercise
of jurisdiction otherwise possessed by the court."49 Moreover, the Ex parte
Young exception50 may overcome the protection of the Eleventh Amendment,
as may valid congressional abrogation.5 ' Of course, when a state waives its
right to sovereign immunity, suits against it may be for any type of relief,
including damages, and the plaintiff may name the state as a defendant.5 2
Waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to personal jurisdiction are
conceptually distinct. 3 Waiving immunity merely prevents a state defendant
from relying on the Eleventh Amendment alone as a defense to suit or to any
judgment that the court eventually renders against it.54 A party can freely
waive a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction because, in large part,
personal jurisdiction serves to ensure that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not
unfairly inconvenient to the defendant.55 In contrast, the Eleventh Amend-
ment ensures that the plaintiff cannot sue the state defendant in any federal
forum without its consent.
5 6
waiver of sovereign immunity); Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment,
48 U. CoLO. L. REv. 139, 166-67 (1977) (discussing waiver by litigation).
48. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299,306-07 (1990) (quoting
state statutes that consent to all suits that private plaintiffs file against state transportation
agency); Baker, supra note 47, at 167-69 (discussing waiver by statute).
49. Pagan, supra note 5, at 488-89.
50. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (adjudicating claims against state
notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment because plaintiffs sought prospective relief and state
officer was named defendant).
51. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (providing that Enforcement
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
52. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308 (affirming judgment for damages against state entity).
53. See Victoria A. Carter, Note, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of
Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REv. 357, 365-72 (1996)
(articulating conceptual differences between personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity).
54. See id. at 366 (discussing relationship between waiver of sovereign immunity and
consent to personal jurisdiction).
55. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (discuss-
ing fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (analyzing whether exercise of personal jurisdiction over
defendant offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))); Carter, supra note 53, at 366 (positing that "'[s]overeign
immunity' ... determines only whether [a state] may be sued, whereas 'personal jurisdiction'
determines where a sovereign may be sued").
56. See Carter, supra note 53, at 366, 369-72 (supporting courts' consideration of propri-
ety of personal jurisdiction in forum only after state defendant consents to suit anywhere by
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Factors serendipitiously present in the lawsuit may not "trump" the rules
for establishing jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the parties ordinarily
cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction when their dispute does not
fulfill the statutory requirements for it.17 For example, nondiverse parties may
not bring their state-law contract claim to federal court simply because they
style the action in a particular way or because other important interests are at
stake.58 But surely, the argument for justifying waiver by omission might
proceed, the Eleventh Amendment cannot serve as a categorical bar to suits
if states and other state entities are free to forego it, just as parties are free to
forego challenges to personal jurisdiction. 9 Arguably, abarthat other charac-
teristics of a lawsuit can trump is not a bright-line rule of the sort that the
Eleventh Amendment's text suggests. 60
Waiver of sovereign immunity and mandatory consideration of sovereign
immunity by a federal court are not wholly irreconcilable concepts. Consent
primarily deals with the expressed willingness of a partyto be before a court;6'
sua sponte consideration of sovereign immunity concerns the ability of the
court to render a judgment.62 Whether to consent to a suit despite sovereign
immunity thus is aparty's determination to make independent of whatthe court
thinks, and whether the court in fact has power to decide a case is for the court
waiving its immunity); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139,146 (1993) (emphasizing that Eleventh Amendment serves to prevent states from
indignity of facing suit at all rather than merely from adverse judgment). Furthermore, a private
lawsuit in state court against a state defendant pursuant to a federal cause of action passed under
Article I may normally not proceed unless the state consents to the suit. See Alden v. Maine,
119 S. CL 2240, 2266 (1999) (deciding that Congress may not require state courts to decide
cases not within federal judicial power). However, the Eleventh Amendment's limitations on
federal jurisdiction are the primary concern of most of this Note.
57. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82 n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing proposition that parties may not consent to federal court jurisdiction when case
presents no federal question).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1997) (providing for federal court jurisdiction over cases in
which citizenship of parties is diverse and amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267 (1806) (interpreting federal courts' diversity juris-
diction to require complete diversity among parties).
59. See Richard Mills,FederalPractice,49 MERCERL. REv. 1045,1052 (1998) (discuss-
ing party's right to consent to personal jurisdiction). Of course, personal jurisdiction without
the consent of the party over which a court asserts it must comport with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the long arm statute of the forum. See International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 319-20 (describing constitutional limits of personal jurisdiction).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating that "the judicial power shall not be construed
to extend" to certain specified cases) (emphasis added).
61. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1979) (defining consent as "an act of
reason, accompanied by deliberation").
62. Cf id. at 767 (defining "jurisdiction of the subject matter" as "[plower of a particular
court to hear the type of case that is then before it").
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to determine independent of the expressed will of the parties.63 When a court
raises the Eleventh Amendment on its own motion, the court does not necessar-
ily have to decide that the Eleventh Amendment actually bars the suit.64
Likewise, a court does not have to ignore completely the state defendant's
consent to suit when raising the Eleventh Amendment on its own motion.65
Rather, when a federal court raises the Eleventh Amendment question sua
sponte, it merely acknowledges that, in cases against states, a condition prece-
dent to the proper exercise of the federal judicial power exists: unless a state
has consentedto suit in federal court, the lawsuit may not proceed unless some
exception to sovereign immunity applies.66 More importantly, requiring sua
sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amendment affins that state sovereign
immunity is too important to allow states sued in federal court to waive it by
mere omission. This question - whether states can waive their sovereignimmunity by omission- is at the heart of the decisions of the courts of appeals
that confront the choice between the permissive and mandatory standards.67
IV Can a State Waive Its Sovereign Immunity by Omission?:
A Split in the Circuits
The chief legal difficulty in determining whether sua sponte consider-
ation of sovereign immunity is permissive or mandatory arises from two
decisions of the United States Supreme Court that treat the issue differently.68
63. See Carter, supra note 53, at 367 (explaining doctrinal independence of sovereign
immunity and personal jurisdiction).
64. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing cases that mandatorily raise Eleventh Amendment
issues sua sponte and subsequently decide merits).
65. See Carter, supra note 53, at 370-71 (discussing judicial opinions that incorporate
sovereign's consent to suit into court's analysis of propriety of personal jurisdiction).
66. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 658, 667 1974) (deciding that Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suit against state officer for prospective relief although "the difference
between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted.. . will not in
many instances be that between day and night"); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908)
(deciding that Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit for injunctive relief against state officer
engaged in unconstitutional conduct); ORTH, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing Eleventh Amend-
ment's potential to bar plaintiff's requested relief against state). The Supreme Court recently has
reiterated that courts should not interpret the Eleventh Amendment as a complete bar to suits
against states. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2266-67 (1999) (contending that "[s]over-
eign immunity... does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and
valid federal law" but rather "strikes the proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and
the separate sovereignty of the states"). There, the Court described the situations under which
private parties may sue states as "[e]stablished rules [that] provide ample means to correct
ongoing violations of law and to vindicate the interests which animate the Supremacy Clause."
Id. at 2268.
67. See infra Part IV (discussing relation of whether states can waive sovereign immunity
by omission to courts of appeals' treatment of sua sponte consideration of Eleventh Amendment).
68. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119-20 (1984) (sug-
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Because the Eleventh Amendment issue was not the primary question that
either case presented, the cases' comments about the amendment are dicta.69
The lower federal courts presently disagree in their resolutions of this issue,7"
and do not consistently treat either of the Supreme Court opinions as dispos-
itive.7" Moreover, in 1996 a court of appeals cited the earlier of the two
decisions without even acknowledging the existence of the second decision
as contrary authority.72 In 1998, a concurring Justice of the Supreme Court
followed suit.73
Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents,74 the origin of the permissive stan-
dard, is the first of these two Supreme Court decisions.75 In Patsy, the major-
gesting that sua sponte consideration of sovereign immunity is mandatory); Patsy v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982) (suggesting that sua sponte consideration of sover-
eign immunity is permissive).
69. Compare Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 91 (stating issue of case as "whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law") with Patsy, 457
U.S. at 498 (stating issue of case as "whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a
prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").
70. Compare infra Part IVA (discussing courts that have ruled that sua sponte consider-
ation of state sovereign immunity is permissive) with infra Part IV.B (discussing courts that
have ruled that sua sponte consideration of state sovereign immunity is mandatory).
71. Compare infra Part IVA (discussing courts preferring Patsy to Pennhurst and
deciding that sua sponte consideration of state sovereign immunity is permissive) with infra
Part IV.B (discussing courts preferring Pennhurst to Patsy and deciding that sua sponte consid-
eration of state sovereign immunity is mandatory).
72. See Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448
(l1th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Patsy only on question of whether court's sua sponte
consideration of sovereign immunity is mandatory); see also Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56,
60 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
73. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381,394 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (comparing Eleventh Amendment to personal jurisdiction inasmuch as "courts
need not raise the issue sua sponte" and citing Patsy).
74. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
75. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. ofRegents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982) (stating that Court
need not raise Eleventh Amendment sua sponte). In Patsy, the United States Supreme Court
decided "whether [the] exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 498. The plaintiff claimed that Florida International University
(FlU) rejected her employment applications for more than thirteen positions. Id. She further
claimed that FlU unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race and sex in hiring. Id. Plaintiff
sought relief in the form of appointment to a future position or, alternatively, damages. Id. at
498 n.2. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies. Id. at 499. The court of appeals subsequently vacated the judgment
and adopted a "flexible" exhaustion rule establishing elaborate requirements under which it
instructed the district court to reconsider the plaintiff's case. Id. at 500. After an examination
of the legislative intent of both § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the Supreme Court determined
that § 1983 did not require the exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Id. at 503-12. The
Court deferred to Congress's ability to prescribe a precise administrative process for § 1983
claims if it wanted to do so rather than instruct fedqral courts to decide the nature of appropriate
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ity's cursory treatment of the Eleventh Amendment - relegating its entire
discussion, including a statement that federal courts need not consider sover-
eign immunity sua sponte, to a footnote in the opinion's penultimate para-
graph' 6 - caused Justice Powell to reply with a vehement dissent.77 Subse-
quently, in Pennhurst State School &Hospital v. Halderman,71 Justice Powell
commanded a five-Justice majority for the proposition that sua sponte consid-
eration of state sovereign immunity is mandatory even if the state defendant
does not invoke the prospect of an Eleventh Amendment bar to the court's
judgment. 9 Directly contradicting the decision of the Patsy Court two years
before, the Pennhurst Court asserted that the purpose of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is to "deprive[ ] a federal court ofpower to decide certain claims against
States that otherwise would be within the scope of Art[icle] mH's grant of
jurisdiction."SO Older cases of the Court somewhat equivocally characterize
exhaustion requirements on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 513. Accordingly, the Court allowed the
plaintiff's claim in Patsy to proceed without requiring her first to pursue any administrative
relief against FlU. Id. at 516.
76. See id. at 515 n.19 (relegating case's Eleventh Amendment issues to single footnote
in penultimate paragraph of opinion and stating that federal courts need not consider state
sovereign immunity sua sponte). During oral argument, a Justice asked -whether the Eleventh
Amendment might bar the suit Id. Nonetheless, the Patsy majority left the question unresolved
in its opinion because the defendant specifically requested that the Court reach the case's
exhaustion issue and because counsel for the state defendant otherwise did not argue or brief
the Eleventh Amendment question. Id.
77. See id. at 519-32 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing sharply majority's treatment of
case's Eleventh Amendment issues).
78. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
79. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,120-21 (1984) (discus-
sing how Eleventh Amendment operates as limitation on federal jurisdiction). In Pennhurst,
the United States Supreme Court considered whether a federal court may award injunctive relief
against state officers on the basis of state law. Id. at 91. The plaintiffs - the United States, the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, and a class of all present and prospective residents
of the Pennhurst Hospital (Pennhurst), a state-operated facility for the mentally retarded located
in Pennsylvania - sued Pennhurst on the grounds that its conditions violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the class members, as well as provisions of several federal and
state statutes. Id. at 92. After numerous decisions in the litigation, including one by the
Supreme Court in 1981, Pennhurst returned to the Supreme Court to protest a federal court of
appeals's order that it comply with Pennsylvania state law. Id. at 95. Reversing, the Supreme
Court emphasized the notion of state sovereignty that underlies the Eleventh Amendment, as
well as the fact that the rationale for the Exparte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment
does not extend to enjoining state officers from violating state law because such conduct does
not concern the federal Constitution. Id. at 105-06. Moreover, the Court held that federal
courts must examine all claims over which they establish proper subject matter jurisdiction,
including pendent state law claims, for possible Eleventh Amendment bars to judgment. Id. at
121. Thus, the court of appeals's injunction against Pennhurst violated the Eleventh Amend-
ment Id. at 124-25.
80. Id. at 119-20.
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the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional status as well, and the opinions
suggest that the Court has long struggled with conclusively deciding whether
a state can waive its sovereign immunity by mere omission."1
A. Patsy's Permissive Standard: A Way to Reach the Merits
Two federal circuits presently follow the permissive standard suggested
in Patsy, considering raising the Eleventh Amendment sua sponte to be
discretionary because sovereign immunity is distinguishable from subject
matter jurisdiction.' In adopting the permissive standard, neither court
dismissed the case as improperly before it, dispositions that may suggest the
presence of policy considerations impelling these courts to reach the merits
of the suits at bar.84 Adopting the permissive standard allowed these courts
to cite Supreme Court precedent as controlling 5 and then to reach the cases'
merits despite the presence of a colorable Eleventh Amendment issue. 6 As
long as Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under certain condi-
tions,' these courts imply, it necessarily follows that state sovereign immunity
is not absolute and thus that state defendants can waive it by omission. 8
In Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities,9 a case filed
against employees of a public university, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit suggested that it is not compelled to raise the Eleventh
81. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (stating that Eleventh Amend-
ment "partakes of the nature of ajurisdictional bar") (emphasis added).
82. See Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448
(1 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (adopting Patsy standard on sua sponte consideration of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity); Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d
775, 777 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
83. See Bouchard, 91 F.3d at 1449 (remanding case to district court); Benning, 928 F.2d
at 778-80 (deciding merits of some of presented claims and directing plaintiffs to file others in
state court).
84. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text (discussing Benning); infra notes 102-
07 and accompanying text (discussing Bouchard).
85. See Bouchard, 91 F.3d at 1448 (citing Patsy); Benning, 928 F.2d at 777 n.2 (same).
86. See Bouchard, 91 F.3d at 1449 (reaching merits); Benning, 928 F.2d at 778-80 (same).
87. See CHEAERINSKY, supra note 18, § 7.7, at 411 (stating that "Congress has broad
authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment"). Professor Chemerinsky published this edition
of his treatise before a 1996 decision of the Supreme Court that made that authority somewhat
narrower. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (holding that Congress may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers). Seminole Tribe over-
ruled a relatively recent decision of the Court See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 5 (1989) (holding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Com-
merce Clause), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
88. See CEM sUN5KY, supra note 18, § 7.4, at 385 (noting that "the Supreme Court has
refused to apply the Eleventh Amendment in many instances").
89. 928 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Amendment sua sponte even if faced with the question directly.' A student,
Matthew Benning, sued employees ofthe university after he sustained injuries
while conducting an experiment in one of the school's chemistry laborato-
ries.91 The district court dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds, citing
both the Eleventh Amendment and a state statute that conferred exclusive
jurisdiction over all tort claims against the state to a designated state court.'
On appeal, the unanimous three-judge panel interestingly expressed
some reluctance toward placing substantial reliance on the Eleventh Amend-
ment; at the beginning of its opinion, the panel announced that it was "cau-
tiously ventur[ing] into the dense tangle of fictions shrouding the doctrine of
sovereign immunity."'93 Although courts and commentators have debated
whether the Eleventh Amendment protects state universities, 94 the Benning
court elected to use Patsy as authority to avoid deciding the question.95
According to the Benning court, the state university's entitlement to sovereign
immunity need not be decided. 96 Curiously, the Seventh Circuit previously
had determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity attached to a state univer-
90. See Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775,777 n.2 (7th Cir.
1991) (adopting Patsy standard on whether to consider state sovereign immunity on court's own
motion). In Benning, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
whether the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over a tort suit between parties of diverse
citizenship when a state law conferred exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against the state
upon the state courts. Id. at 776. Matthew Benning was a student at Northern Illinois Univer-
sity (NIU), a public university, when he suffered injuries during an experiment in an NIU
laboratory. Id. Benning sought damages from various employees of NIU, as well as ajudgment
declaring NIU's chemistry laboratories unsafe. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Benning's federal lawsuit, declining to decide whether Ilinois's sovereign
immunity attached to NIU and instead resting its decision upon the fact that state rules of
immunity govern federal diversity actions. Id. at 777. The Seventh Circuit directed Benning
to file his claims for monetary relief in the state court that the Illinois statute designated and
decided that his claims for declaratory relief did not fall within the Exparte Young exception
to the Eleventh Amendment because of their basis in state law. Id. at 778-79.
91. See id. at 776 (stating facts of case).
92. See id. (describing proceedings below and findings of lower court).
93. Id.
94. See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439; 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1989) (ex-
tending state sovereign immunity to state university); Kovats v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 822
F.2d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir. 1987) (denying state sovereign immunity to state university); see
generally Frank H. Julian, The Promise and Perils of Eleventh Amendment Immunity in Suits
Against Public Colleges and Universities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 85 (1995) (discussing whether
state sovereign immunity properly attaches to state universities defending suits in federal court).
95. See Benning, 928 F.2d at 778 n.2 (citing Patsy to support proposition that "[w]e are
not obliged to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue because the Eleventh Amendment doctrine
of sovereign immunity, though often characterized as jurisdictional, does not function as a true
jurisdictional bar").
96. See id. (declining to decide whether Illinois's sovereign immunity attached to NllU
because other grounds for declining federal jurisdiction existed).
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sity.97 However, the Benning court instead described the sovereign immunity
issue as "delicate [and] fact-intensive" and thus largely avoided it.' After
writing that nothing required the court to reach the Eleventh Amendment
issue,99 and thereby implying that it did not consider the amendment to be
"jurisdictional" in that sovereign immunity precluded consideration of other
issues in the case, the Benning court reiterated that it properly could base its
decision upon other grounds."cc The Illinois statute applied by both courts in
the case was dispositive."'
Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Florida Department ofEnvironmental
Protection"ca is the second court of appeals case to employ the Patsy standard
to some extent. 03 In Bouchard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion when it
reserved a ruling on the defendant's Eleventh Amendment claim and instead
issued a pretrial mediation order."°4 Citing Patsy, the court presumably agreed
with the Patsy majority that sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is not mandatory because sovereign immunity is not fullyjurisdictional.
105
97. See id. at 777 (citing Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1987)).
98. See id. (describing sovereign immunity issue as "delicate [and] fact-intensive" and
largely avoiding it).
99. See id. at 777 n.2 (stating that court need not reach Eleventh Amendment issue).
100. See id. (announcing that court's decision does not rely upon Eleventh Amendment).
101. See id. at 777 (describing case as "easily decided upon" state law grounds).
102. 91 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir. 1996).
103. See Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1449
(11 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (adopting Patsy standard on whether to consider state sovereign
immunity on court's own motion). In Bouchard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided whether a federal court may issue a mediation order against a state
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment Id. at 1446. Bouchard Transportation and two other
companies, all owners of ships responsible for a spill of petroleum products into Florida's
navigable waters, filed federal limitation of liability actions after the spill. Id. at 1447. After the
district court enjoined litigation pending against the ship owners and notified the Florida Depart-
ment for Environmental Protection (DEP) of its action, DEP in turn filed answers and affirmative
claims for relief and Bouchard Transportation counterclaimed against it. Id. In the district court,
DEP unsuccessfully argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal adjudication of
Bouchard Transportation's counterclaims as well as the pretrial mediation that the court subse-
quently ordered. Id. Describing the Eleventh Amendment as a "threshold issue," the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that courts should ordinarily consider sovereign immunity early in litigation. Id.
at 1448. The court reasoned that "unnecessarily postpon[ing]" a ruling on EleventhAmendment
immunity violated principles of state sovereignty and that the district court in this case abused
its discretion by delaying its ruling on it. Id. at 1448-49. Thus, the Bouchard court held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the district court's mediation order against DEP. Id. at 1449.
104. See id. at 1449 (deciding that reservation of ruling on sovereign immunity in order
to issue mediation order constitutes abuse of discretion).
105. See id. at 1448 (citing Patsy for proposition that sua sponte consideration of Eleventh
Amendment is merely permissive).
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Nonetheless, the court of appeals decided that Eleventh Amendment immunity
might attach to the state Department of Environmental Protection and re-
manded that question to the district court because the Department had not
consented to suit."°6 The court chose not to elaborate further on the constitu-
tional status of sovereign immunity and apparently did not consider the
Eleventh Amendment to limit its subject matter jurisdiction.'07 Although the
Eleventh Circuit has not considered the issue since, the court's ambivalence
in Bouchard implies that a state defendant before it potentially could waive
the state's sovereign immunity by omission. Other courts have found fault
with this position.
B. Pennhurst's Mandatory Standard: Acknowledging a Constitutional
Limitation When a State Is a Federal Defendant
1. Raising the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte and Yet
Deciding the Merits
The Pennhurst standard on the jurisdictional status of state sovereign
immunity - that the Eleventh Amendment requires federal courts to raise
sovereign immunity issues sua sponte - has emerged as the majority position
on this issue."05 The recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Sullivan v. Barnett"° marked it as the seventh circuit of
the United States Courts of Appeals - and at least the ninth federal appellate
decision - to adopt the Pennhurst standard when deciding whether it must
raise the Eleventh Amendment sua sponte." ° Only three of these courts,
106. See id. (describing one of Eleventh Amendment's central purposes as protecting states
from "indignity of [private litigants] haling states into federal court").
107. See id. (declining to discuss Eleventh Amendment as aspect of court's subject matter
jurisdiction because court decided not to address Eleventh Amendment issue for first time on
appeal).
108. See Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: SupplementalJurisdiction, Removal, and theALi
Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 75, 91 & n.61, 92 (1998) (noting that "weight of authority...
seems to [be] that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional" and summarizing circuit split in
which "it appears that more [courts] ... regard[] it as appropriate to raise Eleventh Amendment
immunity sua sponte, because of its jurisdictional nature").
109. 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1998).
110. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopting Pennhurst
standard on whether to consider state sovereign immunity on court's own motion), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. American Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 69 (1999). In
Sullivan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether provisions
of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) violated the complaining claimants'
due process rights. Id. at 162. A 1993 amendment to the Act created a process under which a
medical provider could review an injured employee's medical treatment for reasonableness and
necessity, and the Act permitted the automatic suspension of an injured employee's payments.
Id. at 162-63. The court's opinion began by designating all of the named defendants in the case
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however, then have used their sua sponte consideration of sovereign immunity
to dismiss the action and avoid the merits of the case."' In other words, the
majority of courts that have considered themselves bound to raise state sover-
eign immunity sua sponte concluded that no such jurisdictional bar existed in
the particular case, and thus they went onto decide the merits of the plaintiff's
claim.1 12 This treatment of the question goes far to render their mandatory sua
sponte consideration of sovereign immunity consistent with consent, with Ex
parte Young, and with congressional abrogation because it demonstrates that
courts can be cognizant ofthe prescribed limits oftheir judicial power without
dismissing every case before them. The unwillingness of these federal courts
to allow states to waive sovereign immunity by omission suggests that they
consider it to be a component of their subject matter jurisdiction. 3
Sullivan poses an excellent example of this trend because the opinion
explicitly declares that a court must consider the Eleventh Amendment sua
sponte because it bears upon the court's jurisdiction." 4 The court decided that
it could not determine whether the plaintiffs were suing the state defendants
in their official or individual capacities, and thus the court could not deter-
mine whether the Eleventh Amendment actually barred the claims." 5 How-
as state actors, concluding that the claimants had a property interest in payment under the Act,
and determining that the Act thus implicated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 168-71. The court
decreed that, at a minimum, the Act should grant employees undergoing review the opportunity
to present evidence on their behalf during the state's review of their treatment. Id. at 172-73.
As a final matter, the court of appeals raised the Eleventh Amendment on its own motion and
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints with instructions that the district court consider the effect
of sovereign immunity on federal jurisdiction over the case's state defendants. Id. at 180; see
V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting
Pennhurst standard on whether to consider state sovereign immunity on court's own motion);
Suarez Corp. Inds. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222,227 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Mascheroni v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Atlantic
Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Sindia Expedition v.
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known As "The Sindia," 895 F.2d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1990)
(same); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch v. SIDA of H-aw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 n.2 (9th Cir.
1987) (same); Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 702 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (same), aff'd, 781 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616
F.2d 116, 127 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
111. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Mascheroni, Charley's Taxi Radio, and McGraw).
112. See in.fra Part IV.B.1 (discussing Sullivan, Sindia Expedition, V-1 Oil, Whiting,
Morris, and Googins).
113. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (requiring district court to
consider Eleventh Amendment as aspect of court's subject matter jurisdiction), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. American Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct 69 (1999).
114. See id. at 179 (raising sovereign immunity sua sponte because "it is relevant to [the
court's] jurisdiction").
115. See id. at 180 (remanding EleventhAmendment issue to district court). The plaintiffs
named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a defendant in their complaint; however, the
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ever, the Sullivan court failed to cite its own precedent. In Sindia Expedition,
Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Known as "The Sindia, 116 a 1990
case, the Third Circuit seemed to adopt the Pennhurst sua sponte standard as
authority for its strong pronouncements on sovereign immunity.' Conse-
quently, one might infer that the Sullivan court read Sindia narrowly and
interpreted the case as not having decided exactly what jurisdictional obliga-
tions arise from the Eleventh Amendment."'
Notwithstanding the Third Circuit's omission in Sullivan, at least one
other court has cited Sindia Expedition for the proposition that sua sponte
consideration of sovereign immunity is mandatory." 9 In Sindia Expedition,
the Third Circuit noted the parties' approval of the court's jurisdiction over
the case but implied that the Eleventh Amendment required the court to
undertake a more substantial constitutional inquiry.120 Consequently, the court
embarked on a lengthy treatment of the Eleventh Amendment's applicability
to the case before concluding that the amendment did not bar the plaintiff's
claims.' 2 ' Perhaps because the district court in Sindia Expedition had decided
court thought whether the plaintiffs sued the named state officials in their individual or official
capacities was ambiguous. Id.
116. 895 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1990).
117. See Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Known as "The
Sindia," 895 F.2d 116,119 (3d Cir. 1990) (adopting Pennhurst standard on whether to consider
state sovereign immunity on court's own motion). In Sindia Expedition, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided whether the Eleventh Amendment deprives a federal
court of jurisdiction under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a state,
though a non-party, asserts an interest in pending litigation. Id. at 118. The petitioner, a mari-
time treasure hunter pursuing title to a shipwreck, filed an action for a declaration of title. Id. at
117. Although New Jersey also claimed ownership to the wreck, the petitioner failed to name
any state, state agency, or state official in the complaint Id. at 118. By letter, New Jersey in-
formed the court of its claim and its refusal to consent to suit through appearance in the litigation.
Id. The Third Circuit accepted the district court's finding that the state was an indispensable
party in order to raise the Eleventh Amendment sua sponte. Id. at 119-20. According to the
court, sovereign immunity did not bar the quiet title action because the petitioner did not seek
damages from the state. Id. at 120-21. Furthermore, New Jersey remained free to assert its rights
to the wreck against the successfiul party. Id. at 123. Thus, the court reinstated the petitioner's
case and remanded it for a determination of superior rights to the shipwreck. Id.
118. See id. at 119-21 (discussing Eleventh Amendment and making no pronouncements
on it beyond those necessary for decision in case).
119. See Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1558 (10th
Cir. 1994) (describing Sindia Expedition as "impliedly adopt[ing] th[e] mandatory rule").
120. See Sindia Expedition, 895 F.2d at 119 (asserting that "[a]lthough [the state of] New
Jersey and the Expedition are satisfied that the federal court has jurisdiction [with regard to the
Eleventh Amendment] over the action, we have 'a special [independent] obligation' to satisfy
ourselves" that sovereign immunity did not bar petitioner's claims).
121. See id. at 120 (finding that plaintiff's claims were "not a circuitous in personam action
to obtain jurisdiction over the State for purposes of money damages").
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the case on other grounds,'" the Third Circuit believed that it had not decided
conclusively that it must raise the Eleventh Amendment sua sponte at the time
that Sullivan came before it."
When the Sullivan court adopted the Pennhurst standard, it primarily
relied on V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Department ofPublic Safety,'24 a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.125 In V-1 Oil, a
nonresident owner of out-of-state liquified petroleum gas facilities challenged
Utah's licensing and certification fees as they applied to his business.126 The
plaintiff conducted business in Utah, and the state contended that the plaintiff
fell within the terms ofthe Utah Liquified Petroleum Gas Act, a public health
and safety statute. 27 The plaintiff sued the state on the grounds that Utah's
enforcement of the statute's requirements against the plaintiff constituted a
violation of the Commerce Clause."
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit treated the applica-
bility of the Eleventh Amendment as a threshold issue.'29 The court noted that
the state of Utah specifically omitted a possible sovereign immunity defense
from its substantive arguments in the case. 3° After wrestling briefly with
122. See id. at 118 (stating district court's ground of decision as "that the State had
colorable title [to the shipwreck] and, therefore, the [petitioner] had failed to join an indispens-
able party as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b)").
123. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing Eleventh
Amendment issue sua sponte and not citing Sindia Expedition), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. American Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 69 (1999).
124. 131 F.3d 1415 (10th Cir. 1997).
125. See Sullivan, 139 F.3d at 179 (raising Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity sua
sponte (citing V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir.
1997))). In V-1 Oil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered
whether the imposition of licensing and certification fees upon an out-of-state company doing
business in Utah constituted a violation of the Commerce Clause. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating case's issue). V-1 Oil
protested Utah's assessment of fees on its facilities in Idaho and Wyoming on the ground that
the fees discriminated against out-of-state commerce. Id. at 119. The court began its analysis
with sua sponte consideration of Utah's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and found
that the amendment barred V-1 Oil's claims for retroactive monetary reimbursement of the
licensing fees that it already had paid. Id. at 1422. However, the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar V-1 Oil's constitutional claims against the individual state officers responsible for collecting
the licensing fees in the future because those claims fell within the Exparte Young exception
to sovereign immunity. Id. The court of appeals rejected V-1 Oil's Commerce Clause claims
and sustained Utah's licensing requirement as applied to V-1 Oil. Id. at 1427-28.
126. See V-1 Oil, 131 F.3d at 1419 (describing plaintiff's claims in case).
127. See id. at 1418 (describing statute's putative application to nonresident business).
128. See id. at 1419 (describing plaintiff's Commerce Clause claim).
129. See id. at 1419-22 (discussing as threshold issue Eleventh Amendment's application
to case).
130. See id. at 1419 (relating court's suggestion at oral argument of Eleventh Amendment
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whether sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amendment was nonethe-
less mandatory, the court ultimately concluded that no Supreme Court prece-
dent controlled its decision.13 1 The court finally cited a decision of its own as
authority for raising the issue, without expressly adopting the standard of
either Pennhurst or Patsy.13 However, the court noted that a state's appear-
ance in a lawsuit cannot alone constitute consent.133 On its own initiative, the
court also quoted a Utah statute that explicitly retains the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity while consenting to most suits in its own state courts.3
This treatment of sovereign immunity by the Tenth Circuit fairly aligns it with
the other federal circuits that adopt the Pennhurst standard."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit employed a
somewhat different approach to the question in Whiting v. Jackson State
University."s6 Neither party raised the applicability of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the defendant, 137 a state-supported university that employed the
plaintiff until the president discharged him approximately eighteen months
bar). "The State of Utah admitted it chose not to raise the potential constitutional limitation of
[the court's] subject matter jurisdiction at either the district or appellate level." Id.
131. See id. (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court appears not to have decided whether
consideration of the Eleventh Amendment bar is required or optional").
132. See id. at 1420 (citing Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d
1554, 1558 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Mascheronz).
133. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 1997)
(stating that state's defense of suit is not necessarily consent even though state does not dispute
that it has not invoked Eleventh Amendment).
134. See id. at 1421-22 (discussing Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and noting
provision stating that "consent to be sued in the state's own courts does not serve to waive
[Utah's] Eleventh Amendment immunity" (citations omitted)).
135. See Steinman, supra note 108, at 91 n.61 (listing V-1 Oil among court of appeals
cases adopting Pennhurst standard).
136. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 127 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (raising
Eleventh Amendment issue sua sponte in final paragraphs of opinion). In Whiting, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a judgment in favor of a white employee
of a predominantly black university who claimed that the university discharged the plaintiff
because of the plaintiffs race. Id. at 120. Jackson State University (JSU), a public university,
suspended the plaintiff without pay in the midst of a one-year contract and simultaneously
informed the plaintiff that it would not rehire the plaintiff. Id. Both the district court and the
court of appeals found that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of violations of Title VII
42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so that the jury reasonably could find that the plain-
tiff's race was the sole reason for the plaintiff's firing. Id. at 120, 123-34. Accordingly, the
court of appeals affirmed the rulings of the district court in all respects except that it remanded
the case with instructions that the district court reconsider its award of attorney's fees and
articulate reasons for its award. Id. at 127.
137. See id. at 127 n.8 (noting that state defendant did not raise Eleventh Amendment).
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after he began to work there.'38 The plaintiff raised claims under three federal
civil rights laws.139 The court of appeals methodically reviewed each of the
jury's determinations as to the facts of the case, only to reach the Eleventh
Amendment question on the last page of the opinion. 4 ' By deciding the case
in this way, the court reached the case's merits despite the Eleventh Amend-
ment and affirmed the plaintiffs jury award.141 The court's sua sponte
consideration of state sovereign immunity demonstrated an acute awareness
of its own limited judicial power, even if it ultimately determined that Con-
gress validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the
statute providing the Whiting plaintiff's right to relief.142 The court indicated
its agreement with the other circuits adopting the Pennhurst standard by
considering the Eleventh Amendment to be a limitation on the court's subject
matter jurisdiction and by refusing to allow state defendants to waive it by
omission. 43
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
embraced the Pennhurst standard inMorris v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.'" In that case, the merits of the plaintiff's claims centered
138. See id. at 120 (describing relationship among parties in case).
139. See id. (stating plaintiff's causes of action).
140. See id. at 127 & n.8 (affirming district court judgment in plaintiff's favor and finding
no Eleventh Amendment bar to award of damages).
141. See id. (affirming jury award).
142. See id. at 127 n.8 (noting that university is state agency within coverage of Title VII
and concluding that Title VII constitutes valid congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity). In its determination that Title VII covered JSU, the court emphasized that JSU is
a state-created political body under state law and receives state funding. Id.
143. See id. (describing Eleventh Amendment as "in the nature of ajurisdictional bar").
144. See Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 702 F.2d 1037,1040-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), a~fd, 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (including Eleventh Amendment among
questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction that court must consider on its own motion). In
Morris, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed
evidentiary rulings that the trial court made in the plaintiff's unlawful discharge case. Id. at
1039. The defendant operated the subway and bus systems in the metropolitan area of Wash-
ington, D.C. pursuant to an interstate compact between the District of Columbia, Virginia, and
Maryland. Id. Upon the plaintiff's firing after two years of employment, the plaintiff filed suit
against the plaintiff's former employer. Id. at 1039-40. The court of appeals began its analysis
by raising jurisdictional issues concerning sovereign immunity, federal preemption, and the
availability of an implied right of action against a nonfederal defendant on the basis of the First
Amendment, and the court remanded them all to the district court for resolution. Id. at 1040-42.
The court then found that each evidentiary exclusion that the plaintiff challenged constituted
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, vacated the district court's judgment, and
ordered a new trial. Id. at 1043-49. Because of its jurisdictional concerns, the court of appeals
also instructed the trial court to grant leave to amend the pleadings as necessary to establish
federal jurisdiction. Id.
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on certain evidentiary rulings that the trial court made. 4 ' However, the court
first raised, on its own motion, several jurisdictional concerns that it had with
the plaintiffs pleadings in the case and indicated that it had an obligation to
satisfy itself that federal jurisdiction over the case was proper.1 46 The court's
concerns included whether the Eleventh Amendment entitled the named
defendant to sovereign immunity, whether Title VII preempted the plaintiffs
claims, and whether an implied right of action on the basis of the First
Amendment existed when the defendant was a nonfederal entity.147  On the
sovereign immunity question, the court noted that one of its earlier cases had
decided that each state comprising the partnership had waived its sovereign
immunity with respect to the defendant partnership's proprietary functions,
but the Morris court reserved a decision on whether that case applied to
Morris's facts. 148 In the end, the Morris court found no Eleventh Amendment
bar to its reaching the merits of the plaintiffs case and agreed that exclusion
of certain testimony at trial was in error.
149
In Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins,50 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs; accord-
ingly, Googins is to date the closest case of a Pennhurst-abiding circuit using
the standard to avoid a case's merits. 5' However, the Googins court candidly
145. See id. at 1039 (summarizing plaintiff's claims that several of trial judge's evidentiary
rulings were in error).
146. See id. at 1040 (stating that "[sluch matters casting doubt upon the existence of
federal subject matter jurisdiction are the proper subject of consideration on the court's own
motion, as neither the consent or omission of the parties nor the acquiescence of the court can
confer jurisdiction where none exists").
147. See id. at 1040-42 (discussing jurisdictional issues in case and including Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity among them). If the defendant were an agency of the federal
government rather than a joint venture between two states and the District of Columbia, Title
VII would be the plaintiff's only remedy. See id. at 1040 (discussing possibility of federal
preemption). If the defendant were an instrumentality of the states involved in its creation, their
state sovereign immunity might have attached and barred the plaintiff's complaint See id. at
1041 (discussing possibility of Eleventh Amendment bar). If 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were not
available to a plaintiff seeking relief against state actors, whether a right of action based on the
First Amendment would exist was a question that the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had not addressed as of the date of Morris. See id. at 1041-42 (deciding to
treat claim against state entity as claim under § 1983).
148. See id. at 1041 (noting decision finding that defendant transit authority is agent of
each sovereign signatory to compact and that compact waives signatories' sovereign immunity
for transit authority's proprietary functions).
149. See id. at 1040-41 (assuming for sake of argument that EleventhAmendment does not
bar plaintiff's action and ruling in favor of plaintiff).
150. 2 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1993).
151. See Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (dis-
puting propriety of jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against state agency). In Googins, the
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disclosed that the plaintiffs simply erred by naming an unconsenting depart-
ment of the Connecticut state government as a defendant in their federal law-
suit. 2 Neither the department itself nor the plaintiff raised the Eleventh
Amendment in the case, but the court raised it sua sponte as a constitutional
limitation on its subject matter jurisdiction.'53 The court did not find that the
state department named as a defendant had waived its sovereign immunity in
the case.'54 Nonetheless, the court did address the merits of the plaintiff's
claims and ruled against them, although it did find that the plaintiffs had prop-
erly styled their Ex parte Young action against the Commissioner of Insur-
ance.
155
2. Dismissing For Lack ofJurisdiction: Avoiding the Merits
A decision like that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the University of California
56
poses a problem for proponents of mandatory sua sponte consideration of
sovereign immunity.'57 The case's outcome demonstrates that some courts
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal of claims for relief
that would have prevented the state of Connecticut from regulating providers of health care
benefits as insurance companies. Id. at 2. Two of the Googins plaintiffs were partners in a trust
that provided medical benefits to members of one of the partners. Id. at 3. In 1991, the trust
began to market its services in the state of Connecticut, and the state Department of Insurance
(DOI) began to investigate it Id. The counsel to DOI indicated that a failure to cooperate
would result in unspecified further action against the trust. Id. The trust responded by filing
a lawsuit and promptly moved for summary judgment on the ground that ERISA regulated the
trust and thus preempted the state's efforts to do so. Id. Onthe basis of a 1993 amendment to
ERISA that specifically authorized states to regulate certain trusts like the plaintiffs', the court
of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the state defendants. Id. at 4-6. The court
raised the Eleventh Amendment sua sponte and declared that it barred the plaintiffs' claims
against DOI, although the plaintiffs properly asserted an Exparte Young action against DOI's
commissioner. Id. at 4. On the case's merits, Connecticut could lawfully regulate the trust as
an insurance company. Id. at 5.
152. See id. at 4 (dismissing claims against DOI for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because it did not consent to suit after court raised Eleventh Amendment on its own motion).
153. See id. at 4 (stating that "[a]lthough the parties do not address the Eleventh Amend-
ment in their briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject matter jurisdiction").
154. See id. (declining jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against DOI because DOI did not
waive its sovereign immunity).
155. See id. at 6 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant
Commissioner of Insurance although federal jurisdiction was proper under Exparte Young).
156. 28 F.3d 1554 (10th Cir. 1994).
157. See Mascheroni v. Board ofRegents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554,1557-59 (10th
Cir. 1994) (considering whether court should raise Eleventh Amendment sua sponte). In
Mascheroni, the court considered the validity of causes of action that a former employee levied
against a state university. Id. at 1555-56. The plaintiff, Pedro Mascheroni (Mascheroni), worked
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have used an unpleaded Eleventh Amendment issue to escape a difficult ruling
on a case's merits.'58 InMascheroni, the plaintiff worked as a physicist in a
public university laboratory and alleged that the university discharged him due
to his national origin.159 After the university fired him, Mascheroni initiated
multiple civil proceedings that the district court eventually joined together into
a single case."6 Treating the Eleventh Amendment as a threshold issue, the
court of appeals elaborated on the "prolonged debate" as to whether courts
should raise state sovereign immunity sua sponte." The Tenth Circuit cited
two cases from the 1980s in which it considered the Eleventh Amendment on
its own motion. 62 Although the court stated that Mascheroni itself did not
require the issue's resolution because the court would decide that state sover-
eign immunity attached to the laboratory regardless of whether the court
explicitly adhered to Pennhurst, the Mascheroni court noted that neither the
state defendant's litigation of the lawsuit nor its failure to consent explicitly
to suit would constitute a waiver of its'sovereign immunity. 63 The court
proceeded to find that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff's state law
claims for coercive relief in federal court and thus dismissed the claims for
lack ofjurisdiction.
64
for the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, a facility that the University of Cali-
fornia operated pursuant to a contractwith the United States Department of Energy. Id. at 1556.
After Mascheroni repeatedly criticized the laboratory's projects, the laboratory fired him from
his position. Id. Maseheroni filed a federal court complaint alleging a violation of Title VII as
well as state law claims which the state court had dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens. Id. at 1557. The court of appeals determined thatthe Eleventh Amendment attached
to the Board of Regents and barred a federal court from reaching the merits of Mascheroni's state
law claims. Id. at 1557-60. The court also determined that the statute of limitations barred all
violations of Title VII that Mascheroni alleged against the defendants. Id. at 1560-62. Accord-
ingly, the court dismissed all of Mascheroni's state law claims for want of jurisdiction and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of his Title VII claim as time-barred. Id. at 1563.
158. See id. at 1559 (raising Eleventh Amendment sua sponte and finding it dispositive of
plaintiff's state law claims); see also infra notes 165-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of H-aw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987) and
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1997)).
159. See Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1556 (discussing origin of plaintiff's claims).
160. See id. (discussing procedural history of case).
161. See id. at 1557-59 (discussing jurisprudence concerning whether federal courts must
consider Eleventh Amendment on their own motion).
162. See id. at 1558 (citing AMISUB v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789 (10th
Cir. 1989) and Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1988)).
163. See id. at 1559-60 (declining to reaffirm mandatory sua sponte consideration of state
sovereign immunity but finding that neither state defendant's litigation of suit nor its failure
explicitly to invoke Eleventh Amendment constituted waiver of sovereign immunity).
164. See id. at 1560 (concluding that Eleventh Amendment "imposes athresholdjurisdic-
tional bar" to state law claims brought in federal court).
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The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA ofHawaii, Inc.65 is among
the most explicit in adopting the Pennhurst rule.'" Moreover, it avoids the
merits of the plaintiffs case as well. 67 In Charley's Taxi Radio, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed the district court's consideration of the Eleventh Amendment
as a matter of its subject matter jurisdiction,16 but, in a footnote, the court
wrote that it could describe the amendment's effect as conferring either a state
immunity from suit or a jurisdictional limitation on federal courts.'69 The
court cited Pennhurst as authority for the proposition that the amendment is
truly jurisdictional, and then commented on the seeming contradiction that the
possibility of state consent to suit on the one hand and mandatory sua sponte
consideration of state sovereign immunity on the other presents.1 Consistent
with the court's equivocation with regard to the Eleventh Amendment's
function, the court then decided that, as a legal matter, it could refer properly
to the function of the Eleventh Amendment as either an immunity or a juris-
165. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. See Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the effect of the Eleventh Amendment must be considered sua
sponte by federal courts" and citing Pennhurst). In Charley's Taxi Radio, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether various actions of an association of
individual taxicab owner-operators, the State of Hawaii, the Hawaii Department of Transporta-
tion, and the state Director of Transportation constituted violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Id. at 872. The private operator of a large fleet of taxicabs sued the named defendants to
challenge a contract that granted the exclusive right to provide service from Honolulu Interna-
tional Airport to the taxicab association. Id. First, the court of appeals found that the district
court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the State of Hawaii and the Department of Transporta-
tion because of the Eleventh Amendment Id. at 873-74. The court did not find consent to the
suit by either party or by valid congressional abrogation of the parties' sovereign immunity. Id.
Jurisdictionally, the plaintiff properly asserted an Exparte Young claim for an injunction against
the Director of Transportation's future enforcement of the contract. Id. at 874-76. However,
the court of appeals ruled that the contract constituted valid state action and was thus immune
from injunctive relief under principles of sovereign immunity. Id. at 875-76. Because the court
did not find a Sherman Act violation, it remanded the claims against the state and the Depart-
ment of Transportation to the district court with instructions to dismiss for want ofjurisdiction.
Id. at 876-79.
167. See id. at 879 (dismissing case on jurisdictional grounds).
168. See id. at 873 (describing state sovereign immunity as aspect of federal courts' subject
matter jurisdiction).
169. See id. at 873 n.2 (discussing interpretations of Eleventh Amendment that describe
it as state immunity from suit and jurisdictional limitation on federal courts).
170. See id. (comparing Eleventh Amendment to legal immunity and to subject matter
jurisdiction). The court stated that "[1ike a traditional immunity and unlike a jurisdictional bar,
the protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment may be waived. Like a jurisdictional bar
and unlike a traditional immunity, however, the effect of the Eleventh Amendment must be
considered sua sponte by federal courts." Id. (citations omitted).
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dictional bar.171 Regardless, the court did not allow any of the state defen-
dants to waive their Eleventh Amendment protection by omission."2 Al-
though the court's sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amendment in
Charley's Taxi Radio benefitted only the state Director of Transportation," 3
the Ninth Circuit had previously recognized - on its own motion - state
sovereign immunity for a defendant whose entitlement to it was more ambigu-
ous.'74 The court appeared to be following that precedent.
In Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit closely linked sua sponte consideration of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to whether the court could raise the
issue for the first time on appeal. 6 In McGraw, the defendants were two
lawyers in the West Virginia Attorney General's office.' 7 The state had filed
a complaint against Suarez Corporation pursuant to the West Virginia Con-
171. See id. (stating that "[b]ecause the operation of the Eleventh Amendment has aspects
of both an immunity and ajurisdictional bar, we apply the terms interchangeably").
172. See id. at 873 (refusing to allow parties to waive sovereign immunity by omission and
citing Pennhurso .
173. See id. at 874 (considering applicability of Eleventh Amendment to state Director of
Transportation on court's own motion). Because the plaintiff named the director as a defendant
only to seek an injunction against the future enforcement of the challenged contract, the court
of appeals found that the plaintiff's claims against the director were jurisdictionally proper
under Ex parte Young. Id. The court noted that the State of Hawaii and the Department of
Transportation had asserted their sovereign immunity throughout the litigation. Id. at 873.
174. See Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984) (declining to
apply sovereign immunity to officers of state medical review board after raising Eleventh
Amendment sua sponte). In Demery, the court fully considered the Eleventh Amendment issue,
including aspects of it that the parties did not brief or argue. Id.
175. 125 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1997).
176. See Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222,226-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing
whether courts may raise Eleventh Amendment immunity for the first time on appeal and
whether sua sponte consideration of Eleventh Amendment is mandatory). In McGraw, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the immunity claims of state
officials sued after they filed a complaint against Suarez Corporation, (Suarez) pursuant to the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Id. at 224-25. Suarez published a newspa-
per advertisement criticizing the state's case against it and alleged that the state's prosecution
intensified after the advertisement appeared. Id. at 224. Suarez sought relief on the basis of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law causes of action. Id. at 225. On review, the court decided
that it could exercise appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
claims of absolute immunity and sovereign immunity. Id. at 225-28. The Eleventh Amendment
barred only a claim seeking injunctive relief for the state defendants' alleged violation of state
law because all of the other claims against which the defendants raised a sovereign immunity
defense named them in their personal and not their official capacities. Id. at 229. The court
concluded that it could raise the Eleventh Amendment issues in the case on its own motion and
bar Suarez's claims as required. Id. at 230-31.
177. See id. at 224 (describing parties in case).
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sumer Credit and Protection Act.178 Suarez Corporation subsequently pub-
lished a newspaper advertisement criticizing the state's case and sued the
lawyers when it appeared that the state's prosecution of Suarez Corporation
intensified after the advertisement appeared.' In response, the lawyers
moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint based on absolute immunity, quali-
fied immunity, and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.8 ° Although
the court of appeals refused to consider the applicability of qualified immu-
nity,'8 ' it found that its appellate jurisdiction over the absolute immunity and
sovereign immunity claims was proper.'" The court found that absolute
immunity did not attach to the defendants' prosecution of the plaintiff,8 3 and
it concentrated the bulk of its analysis on the Eleventh Amendment ques-
tion.'8 4 Like the Charley's Taxi Radio court, the McGraw court compared the
immunity-like and jurisdiction-like attributes of the Eleventh Amendment.'
In so doing, the court noted that the protection that the amendment confers is
like an immunity because it bars suit in federal court and is like subject matter
jurisdiction because a court ought to consider it at any time and, if necessary,
on the court's own motion.'86 TheMcGraw court cited Pennhurst approvingly
and stated that a court's discovery of an Eleventh Amendment bar in a case
requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'8 Although no
178. See id. (describing state's complaint against Suarez pursuant to West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act).
179. See id. (describing state's prosecution of Suarez and content of Suarez's newspaper
advertisement).
180. See id. at 224-25 (quoting district court's opinion denying defendants' motions to
dismiss).
181. See id. at 226 (stating court's refusal to consider defendants' qualified immunity
claims).
182. See id. at 226, 227 (determining that court had appellate jurisdiction over defendants'
absolute immunity and sovereign immunity claims).
183. See id. at 230 (concluding that absolute immunity does not bar plaintiff's claims
against defendants).
184. See id. at 226-27, 228 (discussing Eleventh Amendment's application to case).
185. See id. at 227 (comparing immunity-like and jurisdiction-like attributes of Eleventh
Amendment). The court reiterated an observation made in an earlier Fourth Circuit case, that
the Eleventh Amendment "is expressed as a limit on the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id.
(citation omitted); see supra note 171 and accompanying text (quoting Charley's Taxi Radio
court's comparison of immunity-like and jurisdiction-like attributes of Eleventh Amendment).
186. See Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222,227 (4th Cir. 1997) (considering
Eleventh Amendment like immunity because it bars suit in federal court and considering it like
subject matter jurisdiction because court ought to consider it at any time and, if necessary, on
its own motion).
187. See id. at 228 (citing Pennhurst and noting that discovery of Eleventh Amendment
bar in case requires its dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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citation to it appears in the McGraw opinion, the McGraw court's rule is con-
sistent with the spirit of a major decision of the United States Supreme Court
that, at the time, was just a year old.
V The Direction of the Doctrine: Two Recent Cases
A. Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
Making Sovereign Immunity About Power
The 1996 decision omitted inMcGraw, Seminole Tribe v. Florida,188 was
one of the most meaningful Supreme Court decisions of recent years"8 9
because of its significant ramifications for Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. 90 In the view of one commentator, it made no less than a "mess" of Ex
parte Young, 9" but Seminole Tribe does provide helpful guidance in gauging
the Supreme Court's current view of the jurisdictional status of the Eleventh
Amendment."9 In short, Seminole Tribe held that none of Congress's powers
188. 517 U.S. 44(1996).
189. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendmen4 and the
Potential Evisceration ofEx parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997) (discussing Seminole
Tribe's potential to make legal challenges to state conduct beyond reach of federal court);
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision-and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
1 (same).
190. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity is invalid if pursuant to Article 1). In Seminole Tribe,
the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of provisions of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Id. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, IGRA prevented
Indian tribes from sponsoring gambling on their reservations without a compact between a tribe
and the state in which its reservation is located. Id. IGRA also imposed upon the states a duty
to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribes and authorized the tribes to sue the states in
federal court to compel the performance of that duty. Id. When the Seminole Tribe sued the
state of Florida and its governor in federal court, the state defendants claimed that the suit
violated the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 51-52. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that
Congress had made its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity "unmistakably cear." Id.
at 56. However, the Court decided that no provision of the Constitution adopted prior to the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment could serve as the basis for a valid abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Id. at 65-66. The Court emphasized that the states must explicitly
surrender their sovereign immunity in order for Congress to make them liable in federal court
without their consent. Id. at 67-68. The Court then determined that the Seminole Tribe's Ex
parte Young action against the governor was improper because IGRA included an altemative
remedial scheme. Id. at 74. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment barred-the suit against the
governor as well, and the Court dismissed all of the Seminole Tribe's claims for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 76.
191. See Vhzquez, supra note 32, at 1717 (discussing Seminole Tribe's effect on Exparte
Young).
192. See id. at 1717-22 (discussing whether, after Seminole Tribe, Eleventh Amendment
confers merely immunity from liability or immunity from all federal court jurisdiction).
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in Article I of the Constitution include the authority to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.93 The majority opinion chiefly
differed with the four dissenters on the Court's decision that the amendment's
ratification merely "stand[s] ... for the presupposition.., which [the amend-
ment] confirms. " 94 The Court stated thatthis "presupposition includes both
a recognition that each state is a sovereign within the federal system and an
understanding that immunity from suit without consent is attendant to sover-
eignty.
195
The sweep of Seminole Tribe reaches a court's duty to consider the
Eleventh Amendment sua sponte in at least three respects. First, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against the State of Florida for lack of jurisdic-
tion." This description of the disposition is not a mere term of art, but a
statement by the Court that it in fact lacked the authority to decide the case's
merits at all.' 91 Second, the majority approvingly cited Pennhurst for the
proposition that sovereign immunity limits the federal judicial power of
193. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (voiding congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I); infra note 239 (collecting sources advocating view
that initial ratification of Constitution incorporated state sovereign immunity and that Supreme
Court thus wrongly decided Chisholm).
194. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)); see id. at 104-06 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disputing that state
sovereign immunity survived ratification of Constitution); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (remarking that
ratification of Eleventh Amendment reflected popular understanding that Constitution pre-
served sovereign immunity), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
This debate intensified in three Eleventh Amendment decisions issued on the final day of
October Term 1998, as the Court in each case divided 5-4 just as it had in Seminole Tribe;
in dissent, Justice Souter exemplified the fairly caustic quality of this current debate with a
pithy prediction that the majority's "late essay in immunity doctrine will prove the equal of
its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible,
and probably as fleeting." Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2295 (1999) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (comparing Seminole Tribe and Court's subsequent Eleventh Amendment decisions to
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)); see Nina Totenberg, RecentSupreme CourtRulings
Affect Balance of Power Between State and Federal Governments (NPR radio broadcast, June
24, 1999) (describing Justice Souter's reading ofAlden dissent from bench as "in a voice laced
with sarcasm"). See generally College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct 2219 (1999) (debating origin and function of Eleventh Amendment);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edue. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999)
(same).
195. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (describing meaning of Eleventh Amendment in
Constitution).
196. See id. at 72-73 (dismissing case against state of Florida for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
197. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (defining juris-
diction as "authority to decide the case either way").
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Article HL.'" Last, the decision describes the Eleventh Amendment's limita-
tion on federal court jurisdiction as "well established" and again cites
Pennhurst to indicate that the state sovereign immunity embodied in the
amendment deliberately constrains the meaning of Article IR.99 Although it
never mentions Patsy, the Seminole Tribe decision for a brief time appeared
to eviscerate completely any suggestion in Patsy that federal courts may
ignore Eleventh Amendment issues simply because the parties do not raise the
issues themselves.2" However, the Court again breathed life into Patsy two
terms later.
B. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
1. Patsy's Misguided Revival
Seminole Tribe appeared to settle the Eleventh Amendment's status as a
core jurisdictional doctrine until the Supreme Court handed down Wisconsin
Department of Corrections v. Schacht,2"' a surprising decision in light of
Seminole Tribe's strong rhetoric about the jurisdictional significance of state
sovereign immunity.2"2 Two Justices used the occasion of Schacht to elabo
198. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996) (citing Pennhurst for proposi-
tion that "the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal
judicial power established in Article III" (quoting Pennhurst Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89,98 (1984))).
199. See id. at 64 (establishing meaning of Eleventh Amendment for purposes of federal
jurisdiction).
200. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
Seminole Tribe to "supersede" Patsy).
201. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
202. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (describing state sovereign
immunity as "background principle" of American jurisprudence); see also Wisconsin Dep't of
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381,392-93 (1998) (deciding that federal court may exercise
jurisdiction over state law claims in lawsuit when defendant removes case to federal court and
implicates Eleventh Amendment). In Schacht, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the Eleventh Amendment barred jurisdiction over claims properly removed to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Id. at 383. After the defendants removed the plaintiff's
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
case on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Id. at 384-85. The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the presence of an Eleventh Amendment-barred claim in an otherwise removable case
deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over the entire case. Id. at 385. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, rejecting arguments that implicating the Eleventh Amendment automati-
cally destroys federal jurisdiction. Id. at 386-91. The Court reasoned that it could consider the
propriety of jurisdiction over each of the plaintiff's claims, and dismiss them individually as
appropriate. Id. at 389-91. Thus, an Eleventh Amendment barto some claims in a suit does not
preclude a federal court from deciding the remainder of the claims when the defendant properly
removes the entire case from state court. Id. at 392-93; see Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The
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rate on the tension between analogies to personal jurisdiction and to subject
matter jurisdiction in analyses of Eleventh Amendment issues. 3 In Schacht,
the Court considered whether sovereign immunity required the dismissal of
an entire case when the state defendants removed it to federal court and then
properly raised an Eleventh Amendment challenge to federal jurisdiction over
some of the plaintiff's claims.2 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer
stated that the precise jurisdictional status of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity remained an open question."' The Court carefully distinguished the
Eleventh Amendment from other requirements of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.2" 6 The majority opinion does not once cite Seminole Tribe, and it resur-
rects Patsy to support a state's ability to waive its sovereign immunity by
omission." Seemingly contrary to the holding of Seminole Tribe, the unani-
mous Schacht Court stated that the Eleventh Amendment is not a jurisdic-
tional obstacle to the maintenance of a federal suit, at least under the circum-
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 83 n.326 (1998) (describing Schacht as
demonstrating Court's resistance to adoption of "most expansive view" of Eleventh Amend-
ment's limitations on federal jurisdiction). This footnote implies that Schacht is a rejection of
the broadest possible ramifications of Seminole Tribe. Id. However, the Supreme Court soon
returned to strong rhetoric in an important decision significantly extending Seminole Tribe's
holding. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2261 (1999) (insisting that "[t]he concerns
voiced at the ratifying conventions, the furor raised by Chisholm, and the speed and unanimity
with which the amendment was adopted... underscore the jealous care with which the found-
ing generation sought to preserve the sovereign immunity of the States"). In Alden, the Court
held that Congress's inability to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court pursuant to
Article I disallowed Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity in state court as well.
See id. at 2246 (holding that Congress, pursuant to Article I, may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity in state court).
203. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 386-91 (discussing relationship of Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence to law of federal jurisdiction); id. at 393-98 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (same).
204. See id. at 383 (stating that Court must decide whether sovereign immunity requires
dismissal of entire case when defendant removes case from state court to federal court and
implicates Eleventh Amendment).
205. See id. at 391 (stating that whether "Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction [is] a question we have not decided").
206. See id. at 388-91 (distinguishing between need for diversity of citizenship among
parties or federal question in federal lawsuit and requirement that Eleventh Amendment not bar
judgment). However, when a majority of the Court very nearly equated state sovereign
immunity and subject matter jurisdiction one year later, Justice Breyer remarked that the Court
had transformed the Eleventh Amendment into "an immutable constitutional principle more akin
to the thought of James I than of James Madison." College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2240 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's conception of Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional function).
207. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 388-91 (explaining that Eleventh Amendment need not
require entire case's dismissal when defendant removes itto federal court).
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stances of the case.2"8 Thus, under Schacht, a federal court might remain free
to ignore a state's constitutional entitlement to sovereign immunity simply
because the state defendant has failed to raise it.209
Concurring, Justice Kennedy attempted to clarify the Court's rationale
by stating that a court reasonably may treat a state's consent to a removal
motion as consent to the jurisdiction ofthe federal forum, notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment.21 This observation does much to reconcile Schacht
with Seminole Tribe if the state does in fact consent to the removal motion of
a codefendant or if, as in Schacht, the state defendant files the removal motion
itself.21' Justice Kennedy also characterized present Eleventh Amendment
doctrine as "hybrid."'212 According to him, the role of state sovereign immu-
nity in the federal courts is substantially similar to the role of personal juris-
diction," 3 but it maintains characteristics that are "more consistent with
regarding the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on the federal courts' subject
matter jurisdiction.1214 Justice Kennedy recommended that federal courts
explicitly bring the rules governing a state's waiver of sovereign immunity
into accord with those governing consent to personal jurisdiction.215 Under
such a regime, a failure to raise an Eleventh Amendment defense at the outset
of a suit would forfeit sovereign immunity for the duration of the proceeding
and would preclude subsequent collateral attacks to the judgment." 6 Justice
Kennedy would allow a state litigant to waive sovereign immunity by omis-
208. See id. at 392-93 (concludingthatEleventhAmendment does notautomatically destroy
federal jurisdiction over case against state defendant when defendant removes to federal court).
209. See id. at 389 (comparing consent to suit and sua sponte consideration of sovereign
immunity).
210. See id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (treating state's consent to removal as
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit in federal court). Justice Kennedy noted that, as a
practical matter, the defendant typically files a case's removal motions. Id. (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
211. See id. at 384 (noting that state defendant in Schacht filed removal motion).
212. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that state sovereign immunity "bears
substantial similarity to personal jurisdiction requirements").
214. Id. (Kennedy, 3., concurring).
215. See id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing that rules governing waiver of
state sovereign immunity be brought into accord with rules governing personal jurisdiction).
216. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing that state defendant's failure to raise
Eleventh Amendment at outset of suit should constitute waiver of sovereign immunity for suit's
duration); see also United States v. County of Cook, 167 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
that "[t]o create a sovereign-immunity exception to [bar to collateral attacks on jurisdictional
grounds] would be to abolish [it]"); cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522, 525 (1931) (prohibiting collateral attacks on personal jurisdiction when court actually
determines that personal jurisdiction is proper).
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sionjust as it may waive objections to personaljurisdiction." 7 He emphasized
that such a rule would prevent states from "gaining an unfair advantage" in
retaining the ability to raise sovereign immunity at any time, including after
a court awards a judgment to a plaintiff.2 8
2. Making Sovereign Immunity About Procedure
Despite Justice Kennedy's Schacht concurrence, a survey of lower
courts confronting this issue since the Supreme Court's announcements of
Seminole Tribe and Schacht shows that most courts agree that sua sponte
consideration of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is now manda-
tory.219 Perhaps this trend will reveal Schacht to be either an aberration in the
jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment or a strict limitation on the proce-
dure for removal.' 0 After all, if the Supreme Court had decided Schacht
differently, a state defendant could cause the dismissal of a plaintiffs entire
case against it - even when the plaintiff deliberately filed in state court
to avoid implicating the Eleventh Amendment in the first place - merely
by removing to federal court."' That ability seems inequitable.' Although
it addressed the question prior to Schacht, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit stated within months of Seminole Tribe that it con-
sidered Patsy "superseded" by the holding of Seminole TribeED Other courts
217. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(hX1) (designating objections to personal jurisdiction waived
if not raised in initial pleading).
218. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 395 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (proposing changes to Eleventh Amendment doctrine that would prevent states
from having "unfair advantage" over private plaintiffs suing them).
219. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (discussing courts' sua sponte consid-
eration of Eleventh Amendment in wake of Seminole Tribe and Schacht).
220. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 29 F. Supp. 2d 786,792
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (extending Schacht to render sua sponte consideration of Eleventh Amend-
ment permissive when question is whether amendment should bear upon motion to remand case
to state court).
221. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (allowing "any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, [to] be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district...
embracing the place where such action is pending").
222. See Pagan, supra note 5, at 452 (stating that "[a] plaintiff can avoid [E]leventh
[A]mendment pitfalls by litigating in a state forum"). However, the Supreme Court recognized
potential Eleventh Amendment bars in state court cases in 1999. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Congress may not subject unconsenting states to private
suits for damages pursuant to Article 1).
223. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203,206 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing Seminole
Tribe's effect on Patsy). Schacht expressly rejected the next analogy made by the Caviness
court: that sovereign immunity is "jurisdictional" just as is the complete diversity requirement
See id. (comparing jurisdictional quality of sovereign immunity to jurisdictional quality of
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have agreed.2 4
One illustrative case, decided in 1998, provides a good example of the
effect of Seminole Tribe on the obligation of federal courts to consider the
Eleventh Amendment sua sponte.' In it, the state defendants successfully
pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense even though the district court de-
scribed the post-Seminole Tribe status of the Eleventh Amendment as "tanta-
mount" to a jurisdictional matter such that the court would have considered
it sua sponte if the defendants had not raised it themselves. 26 This district
court also cited Pennhurst with approval but did not mention Schacht as
qualifying the doctrine any further in this nonremoval context.' The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey accorded the question
similar treatment in another post-Seminole Tribe and post-Schacht decision
in which the court considered the Eleventh Amendment as an aspect of the
court's subject matter jurisdiction." Later that year, the same court reaf-
firned that contention, emphasizing then that Seminole Tribe made the
Eleventh Amendment equivalent to the complete diversity requirement and the
well-pleaded complaint rule for jurisdictional purposes.' The next section
of this Note provides a good reason why that comparison is sound.
PT The Federalism Connection
One Supreme Court Justice has observed that the federal Constitution
"split the atom of sovereignty, "' so that the states and the national govern-
complete diversity requirement); DetroitEdison Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (interpreting Schacht
to render Caviness's comparison of Eleventh Amendment and complete diversity requirement
inaccurate). However, the Caviness court's subsequent observation that the two are similar in
that "neither the litigants' consent, nor oversight, nor convenience can constitutionalize a court's
exercise of illegal power" remains tenable after Schacht. Caviness, 99 F.3d at 206.
224. See In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 813 (D.N.J. 1997) (considering Patsy superseded by
Seminole Tribe and citing Caviness); Pieve-Marin v. Combas-Sancho, 967 F. Supp. 667, 671
(D.P.R. 1997) (same); In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61, 63 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); In re Tri-City Turf
Club, Inc., 203 B.R. 617,619 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) (same); Keller v. Dailey, 706 N.E.2d 28,
30 (Ohio App. 1997) (same).
225. See Vinson v. Clarke County, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1298-99 & nn.14-15 (S.D. Ala.
1998) (discussing Eleventh Amendment issues in case).
226. See id. at 1299 n.14 (declaring that "the court would consider Eleventh Amendment
immunity sua sponte since sovereign immunity is considered tantamount to a jurisdictional
matter that can be raised at any stage of the litigation by the court or a party").
227. See id. at 1299 n.15 (citing Pennhurst with approval but not mentioning Schacht).
228. See In re Fennelly, 212 BR. 61, 62 (D.N.J. 1997) (considering sua sponte whether
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprives court of subject matter jurisdiction).
229. See In re Kish, 212 B.R. 808, 813 (D.N.J. 1997) (raising Eleventh Amendment sua
sponte because Seminole Tribe makes sovereign immunity like subject matter jurisdiction
requirements).
230. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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ment share the various functions inherent in the service of the American
citizenry. Consequences ofthis fact pervade the operation of each of the three
branches of the national government,"' but issues of federalism are especially
important to discussions of the jurisdiction of federal courts. 2 As a constitu-
tional provision specifically restricting the ability of the federal courts to
consider cases against a state, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
implicates federalism significantly. 33 Similarly, the traditional requirements
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lawsuit also protect the federal
structure in important ways.3 4 This connection provides further justification
for treating these doctrines identically in the law of federal courts.
A litigant seeking the jurisdiction of a federal court has the burden of
proving that federal jurisdiction is proper.23' Federal courts have limited
jurisdiction only, but most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction and
a presumption exists in favor of a litigant's ability to bring a case in them. 6
The constitutional provisions and statutes conferring subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts promote a juridical preference for state courts and
reserve the federal courts for matters of truly national concern 37  Conse-
quently, federal subject matter jurisdiction protects the sovereignty and auton-
231. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating limited powers of Congress); U.S. CONST.
art. II §§ 2-3 (enumerating limited powers of President); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (enumerating
outer boundaries of federal court jurisdiction).
232. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 1.5 (discussing federalism as one of two underly-
ing policy considerations in discussions of federal jurisdiction).
233. See id. § 7.1, at 368 (describing Eleventh Amendment as "particularly important in
defining the relationship between the federal and state governments"); Baker, supra note 47, at
165 (describing Eleventh Amendment law as "primarily concerned with the structure of a
federal system"); V~zquez, supra note 32, at 1685 (explaining that "[w]hile the Constitution
itself imposes numerous legal obligations on the states and gives Congress the power to impose
additional obligations, the Eleventh Amendment by its terms prevents the federal courts from
entertaining suits against states brought by citizens of other states").
234. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202,212 (1971) (remarking that limited
grants of federal court jurisdiction promote "[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state
governments" (quoting Healy v. Ralla, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934))); cf John N. Drobak, The
Federalism Theme inPersonalJurisdiction, 68 IOWAL.REV. 1015,1050-66 (1983) (discussing
how rules for personal jurisdiction reinforce federalism).
235. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 7, at 27 (discussing fundamental principles of federal
jurisdiction and noting that litigant seeking federal forum has burden of proving that federal
jurisdiction is proper).
236. See id. (discussing differences between jurisdiction of state and federal courts).
237. See CHEMB1INSKY, supra note 18, § 1.5, at 37 (discussing role of comity principles
in federal jurisdiction); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1988) (noting importance of federalism in Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal jurisdictional statutes). Professor Fallon also noted that "the Court commonly reasons
that Congress would have intended to respect state interests associated with the performance of
traditional sovereign functions and especially to prescribe deference to state judicial proceed-
ings." Id.
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omy of the states, and its importance demands that courts raise defects in
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte"35
A central question in any historical consideration ofthe Eleventh Amend-
ment is whether the sovereign immunity provision gave the states a new
protection or merely restored a common-law immunity that the Supreme Court
somehow overlooked in Chisholm."9 Regardless of the answer,24 the design
of the federal system contains an inherent tension between the sovereign states
and the sovereign nation ofthe United States.241 The amendment's prohibition
of suits against one sovereign in the judicial system ofthe other reinforces the
meaning of federalism to our government.242
Protecting state interests is a central purpose of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.243 A strict adherence to state sovereign immunity in federal courts, as
238. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, § 1.5, at 37 (discussing role of comity principles
in federal jurisdiction).
239. See id. § 7.2, at 369-72 (discussing whether Constitution preserved state sovereign
immunity); ORTI, supra note 2, at 13-18,22 (comparing opinions in Chisholm); MARTIN H.
REDISi-I,FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONSiNT-EALLoCATIONOFJUDICIALPoWER179-80 (2d
ed. 1990) (summarizing scholarly debate concerning origins of state sovereign immunity).
240. See C-EMEP]NSKY, supra note 18, § 7.3, at 374-81 (summarizing three leading
theories of history of state sovereign immunity).
241. See Amar, supra note 13, at 1426 (noting ability of state sovereignty to frustrate
federal policy); Baker, supra note 47, at 159, 173 (noting that federal system requires accommo-
dation of many competing sovereignties and that Eleventh Amendment "concern[s] tension
between state autonomy and national authority"); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1067 (describing
concept of two coexisting sovereigns as difficult for some Framers to understand).
242. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2263-64 (1999) (discussing importance of
"essential principles of federalism" and "the special role of the state courts in the constitutional
design" in determination of Eleventh Amendment's significance); Baker, supra note 47, at 165
(describing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as "trying to define the demands that federalism
makes on the judiciary"); Fallon, supra note 237, at 1152-53 (discussing importance of state
sovereignty to American federalism); Pagan, supra note 5, at 448-49 (describing Eleventh
Amendment as "more [ a symbol of federalism than [ a text... like other species of positive
law"); cf. Amar, supra note 13, at 1490 (noting that sovereignty entitles governments to legal
privileges not available to private citizens). According to Professor Fallon's description of
federalism, the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates the Framers' understanding that the states -
including state courts - "were left the 'responsibility for dealing, and... the] authority to deal,
with the whole gamut of problems cast up out of the flux of everyday life."' Fallon, supra note
237, at 1153 (citation omitted). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court made a substantial
effort to posit the practical consequences of an absence of state sovereign immunity. See Alden,
119 S. Ct. at 2263-67 (discussing increased burden on states that would result from eradication
of state sovereign immunity).
243. • See Baker, supra note 47, at 172 (noting that "[c]onsiderations of federalism seem to
underlie all aspects of the [E]leventh [A]mendment"); Fallon, supra note 237, at 1144 (discuss-
ing importance of federalism in judicial decisions "defining the constitutional scope of state
sovereign immunity and fixing the meaning of the [E]leventh [A]mendment").
RAISING THE ELEVENTHAMFATDMENT SUA SPONTE
mandatory sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amendment promotes,
advances that purpose.244 When a state faces suit in federal court, that state
is at the mercy of another sovereign. 4' The sovereign national government
has no inherent interest in protecting the interests of any particular state, and
its courts may not render judgments against states without offending the states
themselves.24 However, when a state faces suit in its own courts, the state
receives the benefit of its own courts' willingness to protect the interests of
the same sovereign.247 Offense to the sovereign state by an unwanted, adverse
judgment probably is less likely when the states enjoy immunity from
unconsented suits in federal court, and this result holds the state's autonomy -
indeed, its sovereignty - in higher regard.24 Because these consequences
serve much the same purpose as the requirement that a court properly have
jurisdiction over a case's subject matter, the federal judiciary should treat the
two issues alike.
V. Conclusion
Courts adopting the Patsy standard may have good intentions. Dismissal
on Eleventh Amendment grounds when the defendant does not plead sover-
eign immunity in the first instance would have additional consequences that
these courts might be avoiding. First, dismissal would require the parties to
endure litigation in state court when they expressed contentment with the
federal forua. 249 This burden could place great expense and inconvenience
upon the parties when the plaintiff chose federal court and the state defendant
participated in the suit despite its sovereign immunity. Second, dismissal
based on sovereign immunity would risk intrusion by the state courts upon an
important federal interest: monitoring the interference of states in the affairs
244. See Fallon, supra note 237, at 1193 (discussing connection of state sovereign
immunity to federalism).
245. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1069, 1072 (designating immunity from suit in court of
another sovereign as fundamental attribute oftrue sovereign).
246. See Baker, supra note 47, at 175 (noting that states "would prefer to shield all [their]
activities from federal jurisdiction"); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1066-67 (noting that national
government does not derive power nor legitimacy from states, but from people).
247. See Baker, supra note 47, at 175 (noting that states consider suits against them in their
own court systems safer and more familiar); Field, supra note 5, at 548-49 (discussing tenden-
cies of state judiciaries to exhibit bias against federal interests that plaintiffs assert against
states).
248. See Field, supra note 5, at 548-49 (discussing tendencies of state judiciaries to exhibit
bias against federal interests that plaintiffs assert against states).
249. See Pfander, supra note 32, at 1379-80 (discussing Eleventh Amendment as "forum-
allocation principle"). However, Professor Pfander is skeptical that the drafters of the Eleventh
Amendment intended it to direct otherwise proper federal suits into state courts. Id. at 1380.
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of the national govemment.50 As federal courts more strictly enforce state
sovereign immunity, the recognition and enforcement of federal rights might
depend increasingly on state courts' voluntary fidelity to the national govern-
ment." Furthermore, if the Eleventh Amendment obligates federal courts to
look for sovereign immunity issues on their own motions, when doing so, the
courts might tend to find that sovereign immunity often bars the case. Conse-
quently, states may begin to find that the amendment insulates their own
conduct from the reach of any court in which the states did not actually
consent to suit.
2 12
These seductive hypotheses do not justify permitting waiver by omis-
sion, however. In the Patsy case itself, the standard permitted the Supreme
Court to decide an issue central to the plaintiff's right to relief." From that
day, Patsy has given federal courts license to pass over an otherwise inconve-
nient constitutional roadblock in order to serve other purposes with their
decisions. However, these courts exceed their constitutional authority when
they decline to consider the Eleventh Amendment's potential limitation on
their jurisdiction. 4 Consequently, courts hearing subsequent collateral
attacks in these cases by the state defendants should recognize that the defen-
dants have strong Eleventh Amendment arguments for having the initial judg-
ment set aside."
250. See Baker, supra note 47, at 172 (stating that "[n]o federal system can long survive
if the states are free to encroach on national responsibilities without supervision").
251. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2292-93 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (doubt-
ing that states will comply voluntarily with federal statutes conferring individual rights); Baker,
supra note 47, at 177 (asserting that "[i]f the [E]leventh [A]mendment cuts off access to federal
court, federal rights would go unvindicated").
252. See Baker, supra note 47, at 177 (discussing circumstances under which no forum
would be available for claims against states pursuant to federal law).
253. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503-12 (1982) (deciding merits
of case notwithstanding putative entitlement of state defendant to sovereign immunity).
254. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (stating that "[t]he entire
judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought
by private parties against a State without [its] consent" (citation omitted)).
255. Cf. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940)
(permitting collateral attack of judgment against Indian tribe on basis of tribe's sovereign
immunity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTs § 12 cmt d (1980) (articulating arguments
for permitting collateral attack on basis of challenge to court's subject matter jurisdiction when
court does not expressly determine subject matter jurisdiction in original action); WRIGHT,
supra note 38, § 16, at 94-95 (discussing ambiguity of Supreme Court's treatment of collateral
attacks on basis of challenge to subject matter jurisdiction); Bennett Boskey & Robert Braucher,
Jurisdiction & CollateralAttack: October Term, 1939,40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006,1008 (1940)
(noting that application of normal res judicata rules to challenges to subject matter jurisdiction
would "go far to obliterate all distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional ques-
tions").
RAISING THE ELEVENTHAMENDMENT SUA SPONTE
The Pennhurst standard is both preferable as a matter ofpolicy and more
accurate as a matter of present Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The
mandatory rule better promotes principles of federalism, 6 especially if one
assumes that a court raising the question on its own motion is nearly certain
to find that sovereign immunity bars the case from proceeding. Just as subject
matter jurisdiction knows no permissive standard, neither should state sover-
eign immunity.
257
Consent to suit, Exparte Young actions, and congressional abrogation in
the Eleventh Amendment context are important prerogatives, and any rule
forbidding the waiver of sovereign immunity by omission should preserve
them." A federal court can maintain an obligation to determine the propriety
of sovereign immunity independent of a state's consent to suit by deciding
that a state cannot consent by mere omission. 9 The fact that a defendant
somehow connected to a state260 consents to litigation legitimately may enter
into a court's opinion of whether it should decide that sovereign immunity in
fact attaches to that party. However, the court must dismiss the action if it
finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars it from rendering a judgment. Courts
regularly dismiss cases on jurisdictional grounds if a plaintiff incorrectly
styles a putative Ex parte Young action or if a congressional abrogation of
sovereign immunity is improper. Thus, the recognition that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts federal judicial power recurs throughout even the most
convoluted portions of this extremely complicated doctrine. A strict require-
ment of federal courts' sua sponte consideration of the Eleventh Amendment
256. See supra Part VI (discussing federalism's importance to Eleventh Amendment
doctrine).
257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (stating that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action") (emphasis added).
258. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 814 (4th ed. 1998) (observing that "[tihe stakes involved in inter-
preting the Eleventh Amendment are potentially very high [because v]irtually the entire class
of modem civil rights litigation might be barred by an expansive reading of the immunity
of states from suit in federal court"); 17 CHARLES ALAN WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 4231,
at 559 (designating Exparte Young as one of three most important Supreme Court decisions
ever).
259. See Pfander, supra note 32, at 1373 (describing ability of state defendants to consent
to suit notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment as "curious"). Professor Pfander noted that
consent permits suits "nominally placed beyond the 'judicial power' of the federal courts
nonetheless [to] be brought back within that power." Id.
260. See Pagan, supra note 5, at 458-61 (discussing application of Eleventh Amendment
to "arms of the state"). The reach of the arm of the state doctrine is ubiquitously debatable. See
id. at 461 (proposing multifactored test for determining if party is arm of state and thus entitled
to state sovereign immunity).
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would bring a lingering maelstrom m sovereign immunity law into harmony
with a fundamental tenet of federal jurisdiction: federal courts are courts of
limited junsdiction.2' Waiver by omission has no place in a federal court
when the scope of its judicial power constantly looms over its work.262
261. See CHEMEMiSKY, supra note 18, at 39 (noting that "[i]t is frequently stated and
widely accepted that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction"); WIGHT, supra note 38,
§ 7, at 27 (stating that "[i]t is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction").
262. See ORTH, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that "few legal doctrines affect modem
American life as immediately as the rules governing the stretch of federaljunsdiction").
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